






I. Claim Certification ................................... 913
II. Allowability and Allocability .......................... 918
III. Procedure and Jurisdiction ........................... 921
A. Procedural Requirements Under the CDA ........ 921
B. Jurisdiction To Issue Declaratory Judgments
(Default Terminations) ........................... 923
C. Protest Jurisdiction of the GSBCA Under the
Brooks Act ...................................... 924
1. Subcontractor protests ....................... 924
2. Warner Act exemption ....................... 925
3. GSBCA authority to direct contract award .... 926
D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the ASBCA ........ 927
E. Maritime Jurisdiction ............................. 929
IV. Sovereign Immunity .................................. 930
V. Substantive Contract Issues and Interpretation ....... 931
A. Anticipatory Breach .............................. 931
B. Contractual Limits on Overhead Recovery ........ 932
C. Calculation of Damages and Adjustments to
Contract Price for Changed Work ................ 933
1. Total cost method and recoverability of
interest ....................................... 933
2. Jury verdict method .......................... 934
D. Value Engineering Incentive Clause .............. 936
E. Cargo Preference Clause ......................... 937
* Partner, Perkins Coie, Washington, D.C.; member of the American Bar Association,
Section of Public Contract Law; Chair, Truth in Negotiations Committee; Vice Chair, Ac-
counting, Cost and Pricing Committee.
** Associate, Perkins Coie, Washington, D.C.
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:911
F. Construction of Option Pricing Provisions;
Requirement for Certainty in Contract Terms;
Unenforceability of Contract Modifications Not
Supported By Consideration ..................... 937
G. Construction of Economic Price Adjustment
Clause ........................................... 939
VI. Asbestos Indemnification ............................. 940
VII. Statutory Construction ............................... 942
A. Recovery of Costs Under the Brooks Act ......... 942
B. Recoverability Under EAJA of Consultants' Fees
Incurred Prior to Appeal of Contracting Officer's
Final Decision ................................... 943
C. Applicability of the Debt Collection Act to
Withheld Progress Payments ..................... 943
VIII. Miscellaneous Cases .................................. 944
A. SDB Preference Requirement .................... 944
B. Record Retention Requirements-Forfeiture of
Paym ents ........................................ 945
C. Causes of Action ................................. 946
D. Liability of Surety for Prejudgment Interest ...... 947
E. Use and Possession Distinguished from Final
Acceptance ...................................... 947
F. Sanctions ........................................ 948
G . Captions ........................................ 948
Conclusion ................................................. 948
INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit issued thirty-one published decisions in the government con-
tracts area. These decisions relate to jurisdiction, sovereign
immunity, cost allowability and allocability, contract interpretation,
statutory interpretation, and indemnification for injuries caused by
asbestos, among other issues. One of the most significant develop-
ments was in the area of claim certification, with two important deci-
sions affecting the jurisdiction of the Claims Court and boards of
contract appeals.
Decisions of lower tribunals (the Armed Services Board of Con-
tract Appeals, the General Services Administration Board of Con-
tract Appeals, and the United States Claims Court) were affirmed by
the Federal Circuit in twenty instances and reversed or vacated in
eight instances. In two cases lower tribunal decisions were affirmed
in part and reversed/vacated in part, and one case was transferred
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to federal district court on jurisdictional grounds, without any deci-
sion on the merits. There was no appreciable difference in the rates
of affirmance and reversal between the Claims Court and the boards
of contract appeals.
There was a significant difference in the odds of affirmance, how-
ever, depending on whether the decision below was in the Govern-
ment's or the contractor's favor. Of nine decisions below in favor of
the contractor, five were reversed or vacated on appeal. Only three
were affirmed. One was affirmed in part and reversed in part. By
contrast, of twenty decisions below in the Government's favor, only
three were reversed on appeal. Sixteen were affirmed completely,
and one received partial affirmance. In 1991, a contractor who pre-
vailed in a lower tribunal faced odds of sixty-one percent of losing
on appeal. If the Government prevailed below, it had an eighty-two
percent chance of winning on appeal. The Federal Circuit was not a
friendly forum for contractors in 1991.
We begin our review and analysis with the court's decisions on
claim certification.
I. CLAIM CERTIFICATION
In United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,' the Government ap-
pealed a decision by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) to allow as contract costs Grumman's dividend payments
on restricted stock awarded to its employees. The appellate court,
however, never reached the allowability issue. Rather, the court dis-
posed of the case on an issue argued by the Government for the first
time after the trial on the merits-whether the ASBCA lacked juris-
diction because Grumman's claim had not been properly certified
under section 605(c)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act (CDA).2
The CDA requires that, for claims of more than $50,000, "the
contractor shall certify that the claim is made in good faith, that the
supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of his knowl-
edge and belief, and that the amount requested accurately reflects
the contract adjustment for which the contractor believes the gov-
ernment is liable."'3  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
33.207(c)(2) provides that "[i]f the contractor is not an individual,
the certification shall be executed by (i) [a] senior company official
in charge at the contractor's plant or location involved; or (ii) [a]n
1. 927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
2. United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575, 577 (Fed. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
3. 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(1) (1988).
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officer or general partner of the contractor having overall responsi-
bility for the conduct of the contractor's affairs."
'4
The Government argued that Grumman's certification, signed by
the treasurer of the contracting corporation, was inadequate be-
cause the treasurer satisfied neither subpart of the FAR regulation.
5
In an unpublished opinion dated October 1, 1990,6 the Federal Cir-
cuit vacated the decision of the ASBCA below. The court held that
because the contractor's treasurer satisfied neither prong of the
FAR requirement, the ASBCA lacked jurisdiction to hear Grum-
man's claim. 7
Grumman petitioned for rehearing and requested rehearing in
banc. The court granted the petition to the extent of reaffirming its
prior decision in a published decision issued on February 27, 1991.8
Four judges dissented from the court's refusal to rehear the case in
banc.9 The court rejected arguments that the FAR regulation was
invalid and held that it constituted a permissible act of gap-filling
under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.'0
Quoting its earlier decision in Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc. v. United
States," the court said " '[t]he regulation constitutes a reasonable
explication of how the "contractor" shall certify, i.e., it identifies the
individuals within the contractor's organization who properly may
act for the contractor in certifying.' "12
In its analysis of why the contractor's treasurer did not satisfy the
4. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c)(2) (1990).
5. Grumman, 927 F.2d at 577.
6. United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 918 F.2d 185 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (unpub-
lished opinion). Ironically-in light of the furor the decision has caused in the government
contract community-the panel had apparently determined that its decision did not add sig-
nificantly or usefully to the existing body of law. See, e.g., Raphael Mur &Jeffrey B. Mulliall,
The Narrowing-and Harrowing-Road to Proper Contractor Claim Certifcation: From Superhighway to
Footpath, 56 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 124, 130 (July 22, 1991) (noting importance of Grumman
decision and "profound reaction" it has caused); Government Contracts Legislation: Procurement
Reform a Top Priority, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) S-48 (Jan. 17, 1992) [hereinafter Government
Contracts Legislation] (characterizing claim certification as most contentious government con-
tracting issue of 1991); Government Contracts, ABA Section Adopts More Flexible Claims Certification
Language, Daily Rep. for Exec. A-16 (Aug. 16, 1991) (observing controversial nature of certifi-
cation requirements).
7. Grumman, 927 F.2d at 577.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 581 (Plager, J., dissenting). Judges Newman, Lourie, and Rader joined in the
dissent. Id-
10. Id. at 578 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)). In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that an agency's "legislative regu-
lations" promulgated under an express congressional delegation of authority should be given
deference unless "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron, 467
U.S. at 844.
11. 878 F.2d 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
12. Grumman, 927 F.2d at 578-79 (quoting Ball, Ball & Brosamer, Inc. v. United States,
878 F.2d 1426, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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regulation, the court first said that Grumman never established that
the treasurer was "in charge" at the plant or location involved, or
that the treasurer was "physically present" at the plant or location.'
3
The court next said that while the treasurer may have had overall
responsibility for the contractor's financial affairs, this was not suffi-
cient to show overall responsibility for the contractor's affairs within
the meaning of the regulation.
14
Finally, the court declined to reexamine longstanding precedent
holding that claim certification is a jurisdictional prerequisite.' 5
The court said that Congress "limited the Board's jurisdiction over
contractors' claims to those that are certified. It is in the sense that
the Board is given no power to exercise jurisdiction over uncertified
claims that the courts have designated certification as
jurisdictional.' "16
A sharp dissent filed by four members of the court took issue with
each of the panel's conclusions. First, Judge Plager pointed out that
the statutory certification requirement is not ambiguous. Thus, the
agency's interpretation of the statute need not be accorded defer-
ence where, as here, the interpretation "neither demands expertise
nor accords with the thrust of the statute."' 7 Moreover, according
to the dissent, even if the statute were ambiguous, the regulation
improperly alters the meaning of the statute by taking away from the
contractor the ability to say who is authorized to bind it.18 Judge
Plager argued that the facts of the case demonstrate the unreasona-
bleness of the regulation or, alternatively, the panel's interpretation
of the regulation.' 9 Because the claim involved a question of
whether stock dividend payments to employees were reimbursable
contract costs, the treasurer of the corporation was among the
"most knowledgeable and responsible" of the corporation's officials
who could assess the claim. 20 The dissent questioned whether Con-
gress could have intended that only the civil engineer who manages
the plant or the president of the company is qualified to certify
claims.2 ' If the panel believes the contractor's treasurer does not
13. Id. at 580 (relying on Ball precedent).
14. Id. at 580-81.
15. Id. at 579.
16. Id. at 580.
17. Id. at 582 (Plager, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 582-83 (PlagerJ., dissenting) ("The statute delegates to the contractor the power
to designate who speaks for it; it does not grant to OMB the power to intrude itself into the
myriad versions of corporate organizational structures." (emphasis in original)).
19. See id. at 583 (Plager, J., dissenting) (discussing fallacy in court's holding that treas-
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satisfy the regulation, "[ejither the panel or the regulation is
wrong."
22
Finally, the dissent agreed with Grumman that the certification re-
quirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. The dissent stated
that the "failure to properly certify a claim under the CDA does not
speak to subject matter jurisdiction-it merely means that the par-
ticular claimant has failed to state a claim for which, under the terms
of the statute, relief may be granted. ' 23 The dissent concluded that
there was no reason to prolong this judicially created error, even if
it was an error of long standing.
24
The court's decision in Grumman has met with widespread criti-
cism, and efforts are underway to amend both the FAR certification
requirement and the statute itself.25 Specifically, these efforts seek
to establish the nonjurisdictional nature of the certification require-
ment and to broaden the class of individuals who may certify con-
tract claims on behalf of contractors. 26 The Federal Circuit itself, in
United States v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. ,27 further re-
fined its views on proper Contract Disputes Act claim certification
and appeared to be trying to limit the effect of its Grumman decision.
Newport News presented a pure certification issue. The ABSCA
granted Newport News' motion for summary judgment in the case,
and the Government appealed solely on the ground that the ASBCA
lacked jurisdiction. 28 The Government argued that the ASBCA
lacked jurisdiction because the executive vice president of the con-
tractor was not qualified to certify the claim. 29 The Federal Circuit
held, however, that summary judgment in favor of the contractor
had been properly granted because the Government failed to pro-
vide any specific evidence that the executive vice president lacked the
22. Id,
23. Id.
24. Id. at 583-84 (Plager, J., dissenting).
25. See Claims Certification, OFPP Seeks Justice, DOD Input on Possible FAR Change in Wake of
Grumman Decision, 56 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 423 (Sept. 30, 1991) [hereinafter Claims Certifica-
lion] (discussing Office of Federal Procurement Policy administrator's request for comments
on modification of FAR and industry suggestions for amendment)Jurisdiction, Draft Bill Would
Make Claims Certification Non-jurisdictional, Allow DeclaratoiyJudgments, 56 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA),
at 618 (Nov. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Jurisdiction, Draft Bill] (discussing United States Claims
Court proposed legislation amending Contract Disputes Act).
26. See Government Contracts Legislation, supra note 6, at S-48 (noting Claims Court pro-
posed legislation makes jurisdiction waivable); Federal Contracts Regulation: Claims Certification
Tops Agenda, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) S-49 (Jan. 17, 1992) (observing OFPP draft language
amends regulation and expands scope of certifying class); Claims Certification, supra note 25, at
424;Jurisdiction, Draft Bill, supra note 25, at 618.
27. 933 F.2d 996 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
28. United States v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 933 F.2d 996, 997
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
29. Id. at 998.
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required responsibilityw-in this case, "overall responsibility for the
conduct of the contractor's affairs."
30
Newport News had alleged at the ASBCA that its executive vice
president had the requisite "overall" responsibility, but presented
no evidence in support of this allegation. 31 In opposing summary
judgment, the Government had the burden not only to allege but
also to submit evidence that he lacked such responsibility in order to
create a genuine issue of material fact.32 The Federal Circuit ob-
served that, given the jurisdictional nature of claim certification, the
Government has the obligation to raise the issue of proper certifica-
tion as early as possible in a board proceeding, and to do so by
proper motion or pleading rather than in a paragraph of its opposi-
tion to summary judgment.33 While the Government did not pres-
ent evidence that the executive vice president of Newport News
lacked overall responsibility, the contractor apparently did not pres-
ent evidence that he had it.s4 Evidently a contractor is not required
to present such evidence in order to prevail on summary judgment,
at least where the official's title suggests overall responsibility.
35
The court characterized its own precedent as suggesting that the
title "Executive Vice President" is sufficient to show that one is
qualified to certify a claim. 36 The court also noted that, although
jurisdiction can be challenged at any time and cannot be waived,
"the government has still not cited any evidence that [the executive
vice president] was not a proper certifying official." 3 7 Finally, the
court stated that "it appears that the certification by a corporate of-
ficer, without explanation, necessarily implies that the contractor is
representing that he has the requisite 'overall authority,' at least
where his title is not inconsistent therewith."
'38
Although the court disavowed any intention to alter the burden of
proof, the opinion has the effect of shifting at least part of the bur-
den of proof to the Government on the issue of proper certifica-
tion.3 9 The court's reasoning would suggest that in future cases-at
30. Id. at 1000 (citing FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 33.207(c)(2)(ii) (1990)).
31. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 90-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,937, at
115,136 (1990).
32. Id.
33. Newport News, 933 F.2d at 1000 n.4.
34. Id. at 998.
35. Id. at 999.
36. Id. at 999 n.3.
37. Id. at 998 n.1.
38. See id. at 998 n.2 (noting that whether contractor is required to plead specifically that
company official has "overall responsibility" is not at issue). Interestingly, the court found
support for this inference in Grumman. Id.
39. Id. at 999.
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least where the official's title is not inconsistent with the exercise of
overall responsibility-the Government cannot successfully chal-
lenge jurisdiction without presenting some probative evidence that
such responsibility is lacking.
II. ALLOWABILITY AND ALLOCABILrrY
General Electric Co. v. United States40 presented the issue of whether
Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) 15-205.37(b), stating that
foreign selling costs "shall not be allocable to U.S. Government
contracts," 41 is an allocation provision in conflict with Cost Ac-
counting Standards (CAS). General Electric (GE) sought to recover
costs incurred in 1982 and 1984 in connection with actual and po-
tential sales of defense equipment abroad.42 When the Government
denied reimbursement, GE filed a complaint and motion for sum-
mary judgment in the United States Claims Court.43 The Govern-
ment filed a cross-motion for summary judgment that was
granted.44
If DAR 15-205.37(b) was in fact a provision governing the alloca-
tion of contract costs and it conflicted with GAS, then it would have
to be struck down pursuant to the Federal Circuit's earlier holding
in United States v. Boeing Co. 45 In Boeing, the court found that a DAR
provision, allowing the costs of a Boeing retirement plan only if they
were allocated in a certain manner, constituted an allocation provi-
sion in direct conflict with CAS 412 and CAS 413 (the cost account-
ing standards governing the allocation of pension CoStS).46 Because
the CAS, not the DAR, are controlling with respect to allocability of
costs, the DAR provision at issue in Boeing was held to be invalid.
4 7
In General Electric, the Claims Court determined that the DAR pro-
vision, which on its face prohibits allocation of foreign selling costs,
was intended by its drafters to operate-and did in fact operate-as
a prohibition against the allowance of foreign selling costs. 48 Thus,
40. 929 F.2d 679 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
41. Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR), 32 C.F.R. § 15-205.37(b) (1984).
42. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 679, 681 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
43. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 72, 75 (1990), aft'd, 929 F.2d 679 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
44. General Elec., 929 F.2d at 680 (discussing Claims Court holding and subsequent
appeal).
45. 802 F.2d 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
46. United States v. Boeing Co., 802 F.2d 1390, 1393-94 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
47. Id. at 1395. The court went on to say that to hold otherwise would sanction arbitrary
and capricious conduct by the Defense Department in its exercise of procurement authority.
I ; see also General Elec., 21 Cl. Ct. at 75 (concurring with plaintiff's argument that CAS con-
trols in event of conflict).
48. General Elec., 21 Cl. Ct. at 77. A cost may be allocable to contracts under the CAS, yet
the Government may determine for policy reasons that it will not allow reimbursement of the
918
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the Claims Court found it unnecessary to determine, if DAR 15-
205.37(b) was an allocation provision, whether it would conflict with
the CAS. 49 In finding the DAR to be an allowability provision, the
Claims Court relied heavily on two factors.
First, the court found that the raison d'elre for the rule was
grounded in foreign policy-i.e., President Carter's 1979 decision
to discourage sales of arms to foreign governments. 50 Thus, the
court said the DAR more closely resembled the Boeing decision's de-
scription of a bona fide allowability provision-a provision making
"costs allowable or unallowable per se based upon a rational procure-
ment policy entirely divorced" from principles of cost allocation.5'
Matters of cost allocation, i.e., whether or not a causal link can be
established between an expense and a cost objective, are "plainly
not" a matter of foreign policy. 52 On the other hand, "[it makes
perfect sense ... to dictate matters of allowability through policy
determinations."
58
Second, the Claims Court found it significant that the contracting
officer interpreted DAR 15-205.37(b) as an allowability provision. 54
The court noted that the contracting officer could have required
that the costs be allocated elsewhere, but did not.55 Instead, he ac-
cepted GE's allocation of the costs to U.S. government contracts,
but then disallowed the costs.
56
On appeal, GE urged the Federal Circuit to apply the "plain
meaning" rule to the DAR provision.57 GE noted that the drafters
of the regulation had considered and rejected language going to the
allowability of foreign selling costs and had instead settled specifically
on language prohibiting the allocation of those costs. 58 GE further
argued that the term "allocation" and DAR 15-205.37(b) as a whole
have a plain meaning, and that plain meaning is binding on the
allocable cost. See id. at 76 (observing that DAR may not preclude allocation but may preclude
reimbursement).
49. General Elec., 21 Cl. Ct. at 76.
50. Id. at 77-78.
51. Id at 78.
52. Id.
53. Id Apparently the Claims Court was not apprised of numerous instances in which
policy considerations have resulted in Defense Department rules on allocability. The rule at
issue in the Boeing decision, discussed supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text, is a good
example.
54. General Elec., 21 Cl. Ct. at 78.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. General Elec., 929 F.2d at 680.
58. Brief for Appellant at 10, General Elec. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 679 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (No. 90-5157) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]; see also General Elec., 21 Cl. Ct. at 77.
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agency and the courts. 59 GE urged the court to follow its recent
precedent in Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg,60 in which the Federal
Circuit rejected an argument by the Government that Congress "in-
artfully" and "awkwardly" selected terms in a statute and had, in
fact, intended a meaning different from their combined common
and ordinary meaning.6 1
In a decision issued March 29, 1991, the Federal Circuit adopted
the Claims Court's conclusion that the DAR was in fact an allowabil-
ity provision.6 2 The court premised the holding on the policy rea-
sons for the rule and the rule's categorical prohibition against
including any foreign selling costs in the costs of U.S. government
contracts. 63 The court viewed the prohibition as inconsistent with a
purported allocation determination, remarking that "the statement
that a cost can never 'be allocable' is the lexicographic twin of making
it unallowable." 64 The court further noted that "the entirety" of
title 32, section 15 of the Code of Federal Regulations, of which
DAR 15-205.37(b) is a part, "relates to 'allowance of costs.' "65
Although the significance of this fact to the court's holding is not
clear, section 15 of tide 32 in fact addresses both allocability and
allowability of costs, and is controlling on the allocation of costs to
contracts not covered by GAS.6 6 The very provision of DAR 15-
205.37(b) at issue in this case follows a sentence which lays down
the general rule regarding "allocability" of selling costs. 6 7 It is thus
apparent that the DAR's use of the word "allocable" was not an
"unfortunate neologism" as the court termed it,68 but rather the use
of an established word in an established sense.
The court's opinion contains other misapprehensions of fact. For
instance, the court states that "[t]he C.A.S. merely requires that FSC
59. Brief for Appellant, supra note 58, at 23-24.
60. 894 F.2d 392 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
61. Brief for Appellant, supra note 58, at 28. Glaxo involved the question of whether a
statutory definition of "product" applied for purposes of a patent extension. Glaxo Opera-
tions UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 394 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The court, following the plain
meaning rule, stated that when Congress speaks in unambiguous terms, the plain meaning of
the statute must be applied, provided that legislative intent to the contrary is nonexistent. Id.
at 395.




66. See DAR, 32 C.F.R. § 15-201.4 (1984) (defining when cost is allocable to government
contract); id. § 15-205.3(b)(2) (addressing allocation of bid and proposal costs where CAS
provisions do not apply).
67. Id. § 15-205.37(b) (prohibiting allocation of foreign selling costs to U.S. government
contracts).
68. General Elec., 929 F.2d at 682; see WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DiCrIONARY
1516 (1981) (defining neologism as a "new word, usage, or expression").
920
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[foreign selling costs] be allocated to General and Administrative
Expenses if, and when, such costs are allowable." 69 The court also
states that CAS are applicable to all government contracts. 70 Both
statements are made without citation and, in fact, are erroneous. 7
1
Finally, the court's opinion makes no mention of GE's arguments
concerning application of the "plain meaning" rule. This is espe-
cially unfortunate since the court was asked to construe a pro-
nouncement by regulators who were familiar with the concepts of
both allowability and allocability, a fact demonstrated within section
15 itself,72 and who deliberately chose to use the word "allocable"
in place of the word "allowable." 73 A proper application of the
"plain meaning" rule would have required the court to acknowledge
the plain meaning of the DAR provision and then to explain why
that plain meaning should not apply. The court chose instead to
"reform" the language of the DAR provision based on its percep-
tion of the policy underlying the rule and its mistaken belief that
prohibiting allocation of a cost is the "lexicographic twin" of making
a cost unallowable. This result is clearly contrary to the court's own
precedent in Glaxo Operations.
74
III. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
A number of the Federal Circuit's decisions in 1991 concerned
the procedure and jurisdiction of the Claims Court and boards of
contract appeals.
A. Procedural Requirements Under the CDA
Borough of Alpine v. United States75 concerned the question of when
the twelve-month deadline for filing appeals under the CDA begins
running. The case involved a joint project between Alpine and the
United States Postal Service (USPS) for the construction of a new
69. See id. at 682 (concluding that DAR and CAS provisions do not conflict). In fact, the
CAS require that all costs, whether allowable or unallowable, be allocated to final cost objec-
tives on the basis of a beneficial or causal relationship. See Cost Accounting Standards (CAS),
4 C.F.R. § 405.20(a) (1991).
70. General Elec., 929 F.2d at 682.
71. All contracts with civilian agencies and defense contracts below a certain threshold
value were, at all times relevant to the GE case, exempt from CAS coverage. See generally 4
C.F.R. § 331.30 (1991).
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing allocability provisions in DAR).
73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing drafters' decision to reject allow-
ability language in favor of allocability term).
74. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing precedent of Glaxo Operations UK
Ltd. v. Quigg).
75. 923 F.2d 170 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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post office.76 USPS agreed to pay a portion of the construction
costs for part of the building, to house the new post office. 77 Upon
completion, a dispute arose regarding the construction costs associ-
ated with the new post office, and Alpine filed a claim requesting
$28,800.78 Although an express mail return receipt showed that the
contractor received the contracting officer's final decision on the
claim on September 30, 1988, it was not opened and distributed
until November 4, 1988.79 Alpine filed a complaint in the Claims
Court on October 31, 1989.80
Title 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)(3) states that actions shall be brought in
the Claims Court "within twelve months from the date of the receipt
by the contractor of the decision of the contracting officer .... -81 In
upholding the Claims Court's decision rejecting plaintiff's claim,
the Federal Circuit said the plaintiff "confuses receipt and notice.
The statute requires only the former."8 2
In an odd footnote, the court echoed its discussion of subject mat-
terjurisdiction in Grumman. Noting that the Claims Court dismissed
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court went on to
say that "[t]he Claims Court has and will continue to have jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of Contract Disputes Act cases. In this
case, however, because of its failure to file a timely appeal, Alpine
was not entitled to have the Claims Court exercise its subject matter
jurisdiction."8 3
In Neal & Co. v. United States,84 the Federal Circuit addressed the
issue of the jurisdiction of the Claims Court when a claim was ad-
dressed to the Government's Resident Officer in Charge of Con-
struction (ROICC) rather than the contracting officer.85 The
Government argued that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction be-
cause submission to the ROICC failed to satisfy the requirement of
the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. § 605(a), that claims "shall be
submitted to the contracting officer .... ,86 The Federal Circuit
held, however, that no basis exists for finding that the claim was not
submitted to the contracting officer as required under section





81. 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)(3) (1988) (emphasis added).
82. Alpine, 923 F.2d at 172.
83. Id. at 171 n.l. The distinction between not having subject matter jurisdiction and not
being able to exercise it is left unexplained by the court.
84. 945 F.2d 385 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
85. Neal & Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 385, 388-89 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
86. Id. at 388 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1988)).
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605(a) where the contractor "sends a proper claim to its primary
contact with a request for a final decision of the contracting officer
and a reasonable expectation that such a request will be honored,
and the primary contact in fact timely delivers the claim to the con-
tracting officer .... ",87
B. Jurisdiction To Issue Declaratory Judgments (Default Terminations)
An important case discussing the jurisdiction of the Claims Court
in the context of default terminations is Overall Roofing & Construction
Inc. v. United States.88 The Government awarded Overall a roof re-
pair contract at the Naval Air Station in Key West, Florida.89 The
Government demanded reconstruction of part of the roof. When
the contractor refused, the Government terminated the contract for
default.90 The contractor then asked the Claims Court to review the
propriety of the default termination but did not make a specific
claim for monetary relief.9 1 The Claims Court dismissed the com-
plaint on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. 92
Reviewing the Claims Court's decision, the Federal Circuit ob-
served that in a 1969 case, United States v. King,93 the Supreme Court
held that the Declaratory Judgment Act 94 did not grant the old
Court of Claims authority to enter declaratory judgments. Overall
Roofing argued that legislative changes since King rendered the De-
claratory Judgment Act applicable to the Claims Court.95 The Fed-
eral Circuit disagreed.96
First, the court found that an extension of jurisdiction to "any
claim" by or against the contractor contained in the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 "carries with it the historical limitation
that it must assert a right to presently due money."'97 Second, Over-
all Roofing's reading of the statute renders meaningless the Act's
granting of jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments in the pre-
award bid protest area.98 The court also rejected the proposition
that section 609(a)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act, which permits
contractors to bring actions on claims before the Claims Court, af-
87. Id. at 388-89.
88. 929 F.2d 687 (Fed. Cir. 1991).




93. 395 U.S. 1 (1969).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
95. Overall Roofing, 929 F.2d at 688.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 689 (relying on United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3 (1969)).
98. Id.
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fected the Claims Court's jurisdiction.9 9 Citing its decision in Ma-
lone v. United States,100 the Federal Circuit held that, under the CDA,
the jurisdiction of the boards of contract appeals to hear nonmone-
tary claims must be distinguished from that of the Claims Court. 10 1
C. Protest Jurisdiction of the GSBCA Under the Brooks Act
1. Subcontractor protests
Jurisdiction of the General Services Administration Board of Con-
tract Appeals (GSBCA) under the Brooks Act was an issue in US
West Communications Services, Inc. v. United States.10 2 In US West, West-
inghouse, the management and operating (M&O) contractor at the
Hanford nuclear facility, was given responsibility for procuring a
communications system for the facility.' 03 A disappointed bidder
protested the award of the contract to US West, alleging that a for-
mer Department of Energy (DOE) employee improperly leaked in-
formation about the award to US West. 10 4 DOE, Westinghouse,
and US West moved to dismiss the GSBCA proceeding for lack of
jurisdiction, arguing that the Brooks Act'0 5 "applies only to federal
agency purchases of automated data processing equipment"
(ADPE).10 6 The Board denied the motions on the ground that pro-
curement contracts with Westinghouse, as M&O of the facility, con-
stitute contracts "with a Federal agency."' 0 7 After a trial on the
merits, the GSBCA sustained the bid protest and directed DOE and
99. Id. (emphasizing requirement that contractor advance actual claim).
100. 849 F.2d 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
101. See Overall Roofing, 929 F.2d at 689 (noting that jurisdiction of boards of contract
appeals is not circumscribed by Tucker Act as is Claims Court jurisdiction). The court also
drew a distinction between jurisdiction to review decisions and jurisdiction to review claims.
Id. The court concluded that the CDA contemplates that the board would review decisions
and that the Claims Court would review suits demanding "money presently due and owing."
Id. As a result of this decision, legislation has been proposed to give the Claims Court juris-
diction over appeals of default terminations co-extensive with that of the boards of contract
appeals. See Jurisdiction, Draft Bill, supra note 25, at 618. In the meantime, the ASBCA has
ruled that contracting officer final decisions on default terminations are without legal effect if
they mislead contractors into thinking that they can appeal such decisions to the Claims
Court. Power Ten, Inc., ASBCA No. 43026, 91-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 24,279, 1991 WL 204274,
at *3 (Aug. 7, 1991). These rulings by the ASBCA assure that contractors will not be de-
prived of a remedy simply because they were improperly advised by the contracting officer
that review may be sought in the Claims Court.
102. 940 F.2d 622 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
103. US West Communications Servs., Inc. v. United'States, 940 F.2d 622, 624 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
104. Id. at 624-25.
105. See 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1988) (setting out provisions for procurement, maintenance,
operations, and utilization of automated data processing equipment). Subsection (a) autho-
rizes the administrator to coordinate purchases, leases, and maintenance by federal agencies.
Id. § 759(a).
106. US West, 940 F.2d at 625 (emphasis in original).
107. Id.
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Westinghouse to award the contract to the complaining bidder. 108
The Federal Circuit reversed.' 0 9 First, the court said that the
plain meaning of the Brooks Act, which refers both to purchases and
solicitations by "federal agencies," fails to support "the board's
holding that its jurisdiction covers subcontract procurement by a
prime government contractor." 110 The court further observed that
"[w]hat is being protested in this case is not the decision of a con-
tracting officer, but the decision of Westinghouse's procurement
personnel. It is also not a procurement by a federal agency, but by
Westinghouse.""' The court held that Congress limited the cover-
age of the Brooks Act to "in-house government procurement of
ADPE" and made this clear by changing the legislation from "by, or
at the expense of, federal agencies" to "by federal agencies." 11
2
The Brooks Act was never intended to extend to subcontractors."
13
The court also rejected the GSBCA's alternative holding that ju-
risdiction existed because M&O contractors act as agents for the
United States. 1 4 Following its decision on subcontractor privity in
United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,' 15 the court held that Westing-
house could not be an agent for the United States because the West-
inghouse subcontract did not bind the Government. 16
2. Warner Act exemption
In Information Systems & Networks Corp. v. United States, 117 the court
had occasion to construe the Warner Act exemption to the GSBCA's
Brooks Act jurisdiction over protests of automatic data processing
(ADP) procurements. The Warner Act exemption applies to De-
fense Department procurements of ADP equipment and services, if
108. Id.
109. Id. at 624.
110. See id. at 626 (reasoning that statutory language requires that protest involve poten-
tial contract directly with federal agency).
111. Id. at 627.
112. See id. (refuting Board's argument that legislative history supports broader reading of
jurisdictional authority).
113. Id. at 627-29.
114. Id. at 629-30. The court also refused the Government's request to find jurisdiction
based on the "unique relationship" between DOE and its M&O contractors. Id. at 630.
115. 713 F.2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
116. US West, 940 F.2d at 629-30. For an agency relationship to exist between the Gov-
ernment and its prime contractor, three elements must be present. Id. at 629. The prime
contractor must act as a purchasing agent, the relationship must be established by clear con-
tractual consent, and the contract must explicitly provide that the Government is directly lia-
ble for the purchase price. Id. The contract between Westinghouse and DOE not only failed
to bind the Government, it explicitly provided that subcontracts did not bind the Govern-
ment. Id. Furthermore, the contract did not indicate that Westinghouse acted as the Govern-
ment's agent. Id.
117. 946 F.2d 876 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
925
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:911
the function, operation, or use is "critical to the direct fulfillment of
military or intelligence missions, provided that this exclusion shall
not include automatic data processing equipment used for routine
administrative and business applications such as payroll, finance, lo-
gistics and personnel management." ' 18
The procurement at issue was a Navy contract for a sophisticated
intrusion detection system at four overseas air stations.1 19 The pur-
pose of the system was to detect and prevent terrorist attacks. It
included computers, card readers, central displays, cameras, fiber
optic networks, and infrared detectors.1 20 The GSBCA found that
the intrusion detection system was "critical to the direct fulfillment
of a military mission" and that the equipment did not serve a rou-
tine business or administrative purpose. 12' The Federal Circuit
agreed. 122
3. GSBCA authority to direct contract award
In SMS Data Products Group, Inc. v. Austin, 123 the second-lowest bid-
der on a Treasury Department computer solicitation appealed deci-
sions of the GSBCA refusing to direct to it an award of the
contract. 124 In an earlier protest, the GSBCA had determined that
the awardee's proposal did not satisfy certain "mandatory" techni-
cal requirements outlined by the Treasury Department. 125 Rather
than directing that the contract be awarded to the lowest bidder in
compliance, SMS, the GSBCA ordered Treasury to reexamine its
needs. 126 After so doing, Treasury decided its needs had changed
and ordered a new round of best and final offers (BAFOs). 127 SMS
protested this decision. It argued that it should have been awarded
the contract as the lowest responsive bidder and that Treasury's new
solicitation was "illusory."' 128
The Federal Circuit rejected both contentions. First, the court
found nothing in the Brooks Act that gives the GSBCA authority to
118. 40 U.S.C. § 759(a)(3)(C)(v) (1988).
119. Information Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 876, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 879.
122. Id. The court noted that although the equipment would be used on a daily and regu-
lar basis, the equipment monitoring function served a military, not business or administrative,
purpose. Id.
123. 940 F.2d 1514 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
124. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc. v. Austin, 940 F.2d 1514, 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
125. Id. at 1515-16.




1992] 1991 AREA SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 927
direct an award to a successful protester.' 29 Even if the GSBCA had
such authority, the court reasoned, it was not clear that a directed
award to SMS would have been proper. 30 Finally, the court held
that there was nothing inappropriate or illusory about Treasury's
reopening of discussions after it decided that its needs had
changed.131
D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the ASBCA
The court addressed the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals in Emerald Maintenance, Inc. v. United States. 32 In
Emerald, a roofing contractor filed a claim with the contracting of-
ficer after the Government withheld monies and paid them to Emer-
ald's workers pursuant to a Department of Labor determination to
apply a higher wage rate than that included in the contract.' 3 3 The
contract contained a clause requiring the contractor to pay its work-
ers no less than the wage determined by the Secretary of Labor.
3 4
Emerald submitted a claim to the contracting officer, with four
counts: (1) the lower wage determination included in the contract
amounted to a defective specification; (2) the Government misrepre-
sented the wage rate for laborers performing roofing work; (3) the
Government had superior knowledge regarding the proper classifi-
cation of workers; and (4) there was a mutual mistake with respect to
the existence of the local custom of paying laborers at the same rate
as roofers.13
5
The ASBCA dismissed counts one and two for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and determined that both parties abandoned count
three. Finally, the Board concluded that a mutual mistake did not
exist.' 3
6
The Board determined that counts one and two were attacks on
the contents of the wage determination. 37 Because the wage deter-
mination was prepared by the Department of Labor, the contracting
officer was not responsible for its content. 38 Furthermore, the dis-
129. Id. at 1517.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1518.
132. 925 F.2d 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
133. Emerald Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 925 F.2d 1425, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Although the wage rate for laborers was lower than that for roofers, it was the practice in the
area to pay anyone who worked on a roof as a roofer. Neither the contractor nor the Govern-
ment was aware of the practice when they entered into the contract. Id.
134. Id. at 1426.
135. Id. at 1427.
136. Id. at 1427-28.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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putes provision of the contracts provided that disputes arising out
of the labor standards provision were to be resolved by the Depart-
ment of Labor and were not within the jurisdiction of the
ASBCA.1
39
The Federal Circuit agreed. Following Collins International Service
Co. v. United States,140 the court said that "[h]owever Emerald
chooses to style its complaint ... the essence of its complaint relates
to the wage rate it had to pay all workers doing roofing work, and
the listing ofjob categories and wage rates in the contracts is surely
one of the labor standards provisions."' 14 1 Even though the Con-
tract Disputes Act gives the Board jurisdiction to decide any appeal
from a decision of the contracting officer relating to the contract,
the contracts in this case specifically provided that "disputes over
labor standards are not subject to the general disputes clause.' 142
Finally, the court rejected Emerald's assertion of mutual mistake,
even though the parties stipulated that neither the Government nor
the contractor was aware of the area practice of paying all roofing
laborers at the roofer rate.1 43 According to the court, the contractor
assumed the risk of failing to investigate local conditions affecting
the work and its cost because specific language in the contract
placed this burden on Emerald.1 44
In dissent, Judge Newman contended that the Board "erred in
holding that Emerald must bear the cost of the government's post-
contract determination" that all laborers must be paid as roofers.145
The contracts were bid, accepted, entered into, and performed on
the basis of a false assumption (by both parties) about the wage
rate. 146 Judge Newman argued that the dispute about liability for the
increased cost was subject to the disputes clause, even if the wage
rate determination itself was not. 147 Thus, Judge Newman believed
that the ASBCA had jurisdiction over counts one and two. 148 She
also contended that the burden of the mistake should be placed on
the Government because the Government failed to make the proper
wage rate determination and because the contract clause relied on
by the majority applied only to differing site conditions.149
139. Id.
140. 744 F.2d 812 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
141. Emerald, 925 F.2d at 1429.
142. Id. (emphasis in original) (noting that labor law also requires this result).
143. Id. at 1429-30.
144. Id. at 1430.
145. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1431 (Newman,J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1431-32 (Newman,J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1432-34 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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E. Maritime Jurisdiction
Finally, one decision of the 1991 docket concerned the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Circuit to hear an appeal from a maritime deci-
sion of the ASBCA. In Umpqua Marine Ways, Inc. v. United States,150
the ASBCA sustained the termination for default of Umpqua's con-
tract.151 The contract was for the conversion of a workboat into a
diving boat and the fabrication of a diving system module to be used
to support divers working on the hulls of Navy ships. Umpqua was
awarded a single contract for both projects.
15 2
In 1990, the court held that the admiralty public contract jurisdic-
tion statute' 5  requires that contract decisions in admiralty be ap-
pealed exclusively to United States district courts.154 In Umpqua, the
Government argued that the case should be transferred to the fed-
eral district court because all aspects of the contract were mari-
time. 155 Umpqua argued that the matter was not within traditional
admiralty jurisdiction.1 56 Both parties relied on the equitable doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction-Umpqua arguing that the boat con-
version project should be treated as pendent to the nonmaritime
module construction and the Government arguing that the module
construction, if nonmaritime, should be pendent to the boat
conversion. 1
57
The court found that under traditional principles of admiralty a
contract for the conversion of a ship is governed by the law of admi-
ralty. 158 The court then addressed the issue of whether the contract
for the construction of the diving system module lay within admi-
ralty jurisdiction. Umpqua argued that because the system could be
operated from a land-based pier, it did not fall within admiralty.
159
The Government said that because the Navy intended the module to
be placed on a vessel specially customized to receive it, the contract
was maritime in nature. 160 Moreover, the Government argued that
the diving module should be viewed as a necessary "supply" for the
150. 925 F.2d 409 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
151. Umpqua Marine Ways, Inc. v. United States, 925 F.2d 409, 410 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
152. Id.
153. 41 U.S.C. § 603 (1988).
154. See Southwest Marine of San Francisco, Inc. v. United States, 896 F.2d 532 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (finding that lawsuit arising over contract dispute between Southwest Marine and
United States Navy should be transferred to district court).
155. Umpqua, 925 F.2d at 411.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. ("[A] contract for repair, renovation, or conversion of an existing vessel is
maritime in nature .....
159. Id. at 411-12.
160. Id. at 412.
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Navy diving boat.161
The court found the intent of the design to be dispositive, holding
that the diving system module was designed to be used to support
purely maritime activities, whether it was actually placed aboard a
naval vessel or upon land.1 62 Because, in the court's view, the sys-
tem contracted was significantly related to a traditional maritime ac-
tivity, and because its main function was to serve in sea operations,
the court concluded that the contract was wholly maritime. 163
Therefore, under Southwest Marine, the court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the claim and the case was transferred to federal district court.
IV. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In one 1991 case the Federal Circuit decided an issue relating to
the Government's sovereign immunity. McDonald's Corp. v. United
States 164 involved the interpretation of a Tucker Act amendment
that allows claims against certain "nonappropriated fund instrumen-
talities" (e.g., post exchanges). 165 McDonald's had been awarded a
contract by the Navy Resale and Services Support Office
(NAVRESSO) to construct and operate between 40 and 300 fast-
food facilities at Navy exchanges. After a controversy over beef sup-
plies, McDonald's discontinued operations and claimed breach of
contract. The Claims Court held that the waiver of immunity did
not extend to NAVRESSO, even though that office directed system-
wide procurement for Navy exchanges. 166 The Claims Court dis-
missed McDonald's suit for breach of contract.' 67
The Federal Circuit reversed on the ground that the Tucker Act
amendment at issue was intended to waive the immunity of entities
such as NAVRESSO.' 68 The court engaged in a lengthy review of
the legislative history of the Nonappropriated Fund Activities
Act.169 Because the Senate version of the bill contained general lan-
guage waiving sovereign immunity of nonappropriated fund activi-
ties, the Departments of Defense and Agriculture expressed concern
161. Id. (summarizing Government's position that if diving modules fell within category of
"supply" for Navy diving boat then entire contract would necessarily be maritime).
162. Id at 414.
163. Id.
164. 926 F.2d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
165. McDonald's Corp. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1126, 1126-27 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
166. Id. at 1127.
167. Id. at 1126-27.
168. Id. at 1133.
169. Id. at 1129-31. The Act extends jurisdiction of United States courts to contract
claims against the United States for nonappropriated fund activities. Nonappropriated Fund
Activities Act, Pub. L. No. 91-350, 84 Stat. 449 (1970) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)
(1988)).
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that such a waiver might encompass groups beyond the control of
the Government. 170 For this reason, the legislation as enacted listed
the specific exchanges of each branch of the military included. 17
1
The Federal Circuit had no difficulty concluding that Congress
intended the waiver to encompass more than just the named ex-
changes. The court pointed out that the statute identified entities
by function, not simply by title. 172 Moreover, a holding that
NAVRESSO is immune could create incentives for the military
branches to reorganize their post exchanges under entities that are
not specifically named in the statute. 173 Thus, congressional intent
is furthered by treating NAVRESSO as subject to suit under the
Tucker Act amendment.
74
V. SUBSTANTIVE CONTRACT ISSUES AND INTERPRETATION
The Federal Circuit decided a number of cases in 1991 involving
substantive questions of contract law and interpretation.
A. Anticipatory Breach
In United States v. DeKonty Corp. ,175 the ASBCA found the Govern-
ment liable for anticipatory breach of contract for expressing an in-
tent to withhold scheduled progress payments from the
contractor. 176 On July 5, 1985, the Navy recommended default ter-
mination of a contract for the construction of a child care facility.
The contractor stopped working on the site on July 16. On July 19,
an internal Navy memorandum recommended that progress pay-
ments should be processed but not issued until the payments were
cleared by the termination contracting officer.' 77 Six days later, the
contractor called to check on the status of the progress payment due
August 8 and was told the payment was "on hold."' 7 8 On July 22,
the contracting officer told the contractor to keep working, but on
August 1 the contractor abandoned the job, asserting that the Gov-
ernment breached the contract by failing to make scheduled prog-
ress payments. 79
170. McDonald's, 926 F.2d at 1130.
171. Id. at 1131.
172. See id. (rejecting Government's contention that plain words of statute exclude waiver
by NAVRESSO).
173. Id. at 1131-32.
174. Id.
175. 922 F.2d 826 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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The contractor argued that the Government breached the con-
tract before the contractor abandoned performance. The ASBCA
agreed that the Government was liable for anticipatory breach of
contract.180 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that neither the
July 19 internal memorandum nor the July 25 conversation rose to
the level of anticipatory breach. 18' The Navy's actions fell short of
"positive, definite, unconditional and unequivocal" evidence of in-
tent, without which anticipatory breach cannot occur.182
B. Contractual Limits on Overhead Recovery
In Reliance Insurance Co. v. United States,' 83 L.G. Lefler, Inc. con-
tracted with the Veterans Administration for the construction of a
hospital wing. 184 The contract was for $11.3 million and was to take
950 days. During construction, the VA issued 200 change orders
which extended the project 498 days. Approximately two years after
the contract award, Lefler defaulted and Reliance assumed its obli-
gations as the performance surety.' 85 Reliance subsequently sub-
mitted six equitable adjustment claims totalling $1.3 million. Four
claims for extended home and field office overhead went beyond the
delay overhead permitted under the changes clause.' 86
The Government moved for partial summary judgment on the
four overhead claims. 187 The Claims Court granted the motion, and
Reliance appealed. 88 The Federal Circuit affirmed. 18 9
Clause G-10 of Reliance's contract, which supplemented the
changes clause of the contract, set a ceiling on the amount of over-
head recoverable under the standard changes clause. For changes
exceeding $50,000, a 5% limit was set for delay overhead. 190 Reli-
ance argued that this provision conflicted with the standard changes
clause, but the court, relying on Santa Fe Engineers, Inc. v. United
States,191 disagreed.192 The court distinguished Morrison-Knudsen Co.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 828-29.
182. Id. at 829.
183. 931 F.2d 863 (Fed. Cir. 1991).





189. Id. at 867.
190. Id. at 865.
191. 801 F.2d 379 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
192. Reliance, 931 F.2d at 865-66 (citing Santa Fe Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 801 F.2d
379, 381-82 (Fed. Cir. 1986) for proposition that G-10 clause does not conflict with standard
changes clause, but instead limits delay overhead recovery).
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v. United States,193 in which a clause prohibiting price adjustments
unless the adjustment exceeded 25% of the total contract price was
held to be overridden by the changes clause.1 94 The court distin-
guished Morrison-Knudsen on two grounds. First, the G-10 clause did
not eliminate the standard changes clause. Second, the G-10 clause
did not shift to the contractor the entire cost of correcting specifica-
tion defects.1 95 In addition, the court noted that Reliance had full
knowledge of the contract clause, and as surety the clause applied to
it. 196
C. Calculation of Damages and Adjustments to Contract Price for
Changed Work
1. Total cost method and recoverability of interest
In Seroidone Construction Corp. v. United States,' 97 the plaintiff re-
ceived a contract from the United States Army Corps of Engineers
to build an embankment, spillway, outlet works, and several roads
on an earlier constructed dam.198 After incurring costs beyond its
bid price, Servidone filed a certified claim for equitable adjustment
and subsequently filed suit in the Claims Court under the Contract
Disputes Act. 199
Servidone alleged both "Type I" and "Type II" differing site con-
dition claims. The Type I claim was that the Army Corps breached
an implied duty to provide adequate information, and the Type II
claim was that Servidone encountered unusual soil conditions cov-
ered by the differing site condition clause. 200 Servidone also com-
plained that the Corps caused delays by excessive quality assurance
testing.20
Using the "total cost method," which compares original bid with
actual cost, the Claims Court found the Government liable for
Servidone's increased costs due to the Type II differing site condi-
tions.20 2 The court, however, adjusted its award downward based
on its finding that Servidone's original bid was unreasonably low. 20 3
193. 397 F.2d 826 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
194. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 397 F.2d 826, 829 (Ct. Cl. 1968). The dis-
pute in Morrison-Knudsen was based on a contract for the grading and drainage required to
improve a 45-mile segment of roadway in Alaska. Id. at 830.
195. Reliance, 931 F.2d at 866.
196. Id. at 866-67.
197. 931 F.2d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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Finally, the Claims Court awarded interest on the certified claim,
but denied a request for $13 million in interest on Servidone's bor-
rowings to cover the additional costs. 20 4 The Federal Circuit
affirmed. 20
5
Although the court noted that the total cost method should be
used with caution and only as a last resort, it stated that the Claims
Court's use of the method in this case was not clearly erroneous.
206
The Federal Circuit stated that the Claims Court "carefully found
facts and correctly applied the law in a rare case justifying the total
cost method." 20 7 Furthermore, the court found that the Claims
Court properly awarded interest from the date of the claim even
though Servidone had yet to incur the total costs it later recov-
ered.208 Citing Fidelity Construction Co. v. United States, 209 the court
found that the CDA sets the date from which interest runs without
regard to when the contractor incurred the costs. 210
Finally, noting that Servidone's contract barred recovery of inter-
est on borrowed funds and that no statute authorizes such recovery,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's denial of any addi-
tional interest. 211 The court's opinion does not discuss whether the
cost of borrowings might be recoverable as an element of damages
for breach of contract, as distinct from including interest costs in a
request for equitable adjustment pursuant to the contract. While
the latter is clearly prohibited by standard contract terms, the for-
mer is not. At least two commentators have posited that contract
cost principles do not apply to a suit for damages. 21 2
2. Jury verdict method
In Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States,213 the Navy awarded
Dawco a contract to refurbish a Navy housing project near San Di-
ego.2 14 Dawco subcontracted the part of the contract that required
Dawco to landscape the housing area grounds. Before performance
204. Id.
205. Id. at 863.
206. Id. at 862 ("[T]his court's predecessor condoned the total cost method in those ex-
traordinary circumstances where no other way to compute damages was feasible and where
the trial court employed proper safeguards.").
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 700 F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983).
210. Servidone, 931 F.2d at 862.
211. Id. at863.
212. JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CON-
TRAcTs 473 (2d ed. 1985).
213. 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
214. Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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commenced, the Government decided to reduce the areas to be
landscaped by forty-four percent. 215
During the landscaping process, the subcontractor encountered
differing site conditions which it attributed to deterioration during a
delay caused by the Government. 216 Dawco sought $325,063 as an
equitable adjustment for the differing site condition. 217 The con-
tracting officer did not issue a decision on the request for equitable
adjustment, primarily because of Dawco's failure to identify the dif-
ference between the cost to perform the work as specified in the
contract and the actual cost to perform under the differing condi-
tions.218 Dawco then filed suit in the Claims Court for $529,935.219
The Claims Court initially ruled that the contractor was entitled
to $529,935, less the original subcontract price, for a total of
$69,935.220 The Claims Court then issued an order stating that the
contractor was entitled to $529,935.221 Finally, the court rejected
the Government's request that the payment be reduced by
$273,472, representing the amounts already paid to the
contractor.2
22
The Federal Circuit found that the Claims Court applied the "jury
verdict" method to what was in essence a total cost claim.223 Citing
WRB Corp. v. United States,224 the court held that the jury verdict
method is to be used only when there exists clear proof of injury,
there is no more reliable method for computing damages, and the
evidence is sufficient for the court to make a fair and reasonable
approximation of damages. 225 Furthermore, the party must be un-
able to substantiate the injury with direct and specific proof.226 In
concluding that the jury verdict was improper, the court determined
that the contractor could neither prove it was injured nor prove a
justified inability to substantiate its injury.227 Consequently, the
court remanded the case to the Claims Court for a determination of
the equitable adjustment due Dawco by the "actual cost
215. Id.
216. Id. at 874-75.
217. Id. at 875. The court discussed the issue of whether a proper claim had been submit-
ted. That issue is not addressed in this Article.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 875-76.
220. Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 682, 704 (1989), aff'd in part, revd in
part, 930 F.2d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Dawco, 930 F.2d at 880.
224. 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 425 (1968).
225. Dawco, 930 F.2d at 880.
226. Id. at 881.
227. Id. at 881-82.
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method." 228
D. Value Engineering Incentive Clause
ICSD Corp. v. United States229 involved an Army contract to supply
night vision gun sights.23 0 The contract contained a "value engi-
neering incentive" clause, which provided the contractor with a por-
tion of any savings achieved by the Government due to acceptance
of the contractor's value engineering change proposals. The benefit
to the contractor depended on the nature of the proposal. If the
Government used the change proposal on future contracts for es-
sentially the same item (contract savings), the contractor shared in
50% of the savings. By contrast, the contractor would receive 20%
of any collateral savings on maintenance, operation, support, or
government-furnished property.
2 31
The contractor in ICSD suggested the use of standard alkaline
batteries rather than mercury batteries to operate the sights.
Although the batteries were a "major component" of the sights,
they were not a deliverable item under the contract.23 2 The ASBCA
ruled that the savings were merely collateral, and the contractor ap-
pealed.2 33 The Federal Circuit affirmed.2
34
The court said the savings were either a reduced cost of operation
or a reduced cost of government-furnished property.2 35 In either
case, they were not subject to the 50% savings clause because the
batteries were not "essentially the same item" as that to be acquired
under the contract.23 6 The contractor also argued that the Govern-
ment did not calculate the collateral savings properly because it did
not take into account the safety and logistic advantages of the new
batteries.2 37 The court upheld the Board's finding that such savings
were not ascertainable.23 8 Finally, the court upheld the Govern-
ment's decision to split the value engineering award between two
contractors.2 39
228. Id. at 882. The court preferred the "actual cost method" because it provides the
court with documentation of the underlying expenses and ensures that the final amounts of
the equitable adjustment will not be a windfall for either of the contracting parties. Id.
229. 934 F.2d 313 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
230. ICSD Corp. v. United States, 934 F.2d 313, 314 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. ICSD Corp., 90-3 B.C.A. (CCH), 23,027, at 115,631 (May 16, 1990);
234. ICSD, 934 F.2d at 317.
235. Id. at 316.
236. Id. at 315-16.
237. Id. at 316-17.
238. Id. at 317.
239. See id. (finding that both proposals were under consideration at same time and dcci.
sion to split award was not arbitrary or capricious).
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E. Cargo Preference Clause
In Craft Machine Works, Inc. v. United States,240 the court interpreted
the Cargo Preference Clause in a contract for the sale of shipbuild-
ing portal cranes. 241 Federal Acquisition Regulation Clause 52.247-
64, Alternate 1, which was incorporated into the contract, required
the contractor to use privately owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels
to transport any supplies furnished under the contract.242 The con-
tractor believed the clause did not require the shipment of crane
parts on U.S.-flag carriers, and therefore entered into a contract for
the delivery of the parts by a foreign carrier. 243 Subsequently, the
Navy directed the contractor to use U.S.-flag carriers for transporta-
tion of the parts. 244 The contractor canceled its original contract
and filed a claim for equitable adjustment for the increased costs of
using a U.S.-flag carrier.245 The Claims Court read the clause to
require the use of U.S.-flag carriers and denied the claim.246 The
Federal Circuit reversed.247
The court looked to the contract itself, which specified the deliv-
ery of complete cranes. Therefore, the court reasoned, the "sup-
plies" to be furnished under the contract were complete cranes.
Contrary to the assertion of the Claims Court, "supplies" in this
context cannot refer to parts of cranes.248 Moreover, the court
noted that it had been the longstanding practice of the Department
of Defense to apply the clause in question to end items only.24 9
F. Construction of Option Pricing Provisions; Requirement for Certainty in
Contract Terms; Unenforceability of Contract Modifications Not
Supported by Consideration
In Aviation Contractor Employees, Inc. v. United States,250 the Federal
Circuit reviewed issues related to the pricing of contracts once an
240. 926 F.2d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
241. Craft Mach. Works, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
242. Id. at 1111-12.
243. Id. at 1112.
244. Id. at 1112-13.
245. Id. at 1113.
246. Craft Mach. Works, Inc. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 355, 371 (1990), rev'd, 926 F.2d
I110 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
247. Craft, 926 F.2d at 1116.
248. Id. at 1113.
249. Id. at 1114. Contractors and their attorneys should be aware that Defense Acquisi-
tion Circular 88-6, effective May 31, 1989, revised the cargo preference clause to define "sup-
plies" to include parts and components incorporated into end items. Thus, the court's
decision will not apply to contracts entered into under solicitations issued on or after May 31,
1989.
250. 945 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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option to renew has been executed. 25 1 The contract at issue was for
flight training for student pilots at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The con-
tract required that this service be provided in 1983 and contained an
option clause for renewal of the contract for up to five years.252 Dis-
agreements arose over the pricing of the option years soon after the
Government exercised its first option. 253 The contract contained no
explicit provisions for pricing for any year other than 1983. It did,
however, provide for adjustment of the contract price in the event of
changes in the scope of work or changes in the cost of wages and
benefits paid to employees covered by a collective bargaining
agreement.
254
The contractor, Aviation Contractor Employees, Inc. (ACE), ar-
gued that all of its increased costs for fiscal year (FY) 1984 ought to
be the subject of negotiation.2 55 ACE pointed out that this was not
expressly prohibited, and that the Government had evaded a direct
answer to pre-bid conference questions about the pricing of the op-
tion years. 256 The Government contended that, due to the course of
dealing between the parties on a prior contract, ACE's president
was well aware of the Government's intent to price the options by
allowing only the two specified types of adjustments to contract
price.25
7
The ASBCA found that the Government's answers to the pre-bid
questions, while "somewhat evasive," put bidders on notice that the
Government did not intend to negotiate the option years on a total
cost basis. 258 It also found that ACE's president was aware of how
the Government intended to price subsequent options. 259 The Fed-
eral Circuit declined to upset these factual findings and relied par-
ticularly on the finding regarding ACE's "awareness" to affirm the
Board with respect to FY 1984.260
Disposition of the issues in pricing FY 1985 hinged on a bilateral
modification to the contract executed by ACE and the Government.
The ASBCA found that the parties intended to negotiate the price
for FY 1985 without regard to FY 1984 pricing.261 The ASBCA con-
251. Aviation Contractor Employees, Inc. v. United States, 945 F.2d 1568, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1570.
254. Id. at 1569.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1570.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1571.
259. Id at 1571-72.
260. Id. at 1572.
261. Id.
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cluded, however, that the modification was simply an agreement to
negotiate a price without establishing what cost factors would be
considered and was, therefore, unenforceable due to uncertainty.
262
The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that the "emerging view" is
that "an agreement which specifies that certain terms will be agreed
on by future negotiation is sufficiently definite, because it impliedly
places an obligation on the parties to negotiate in good faith."26
3
Noting that there was evidence that the Government had not negoti-
ated in good faith, the Federal Circuit concluded that the parties
intended to negotiate a contract price for FY 1985 taking all of
ACE's costs into account, and that a trial court or board should be
able to determine a reasonable price.
264
This conclusion led the court to consider an issue the ASBCA did
not consider, namely, whether the modification was unenforceable
because the Government had received no consideration for its
agreement to consider additional costs in the negotiation. 265 The
court noted that there would be a lack of consideration if all the
Government received in return for the modification was perform-
ance of a pre-existing duty that is "neither doubtful nor the subject
of honest dispute. ' 266 There was some evidence that ACE agreed
to forego further litigation of pricing issues in connection with the
modification, and there may have existed at the time an honest dis-
pute concerning the costs to be used in calculating the contract
price.267 Therefore, settlement of the dispute could constitute ade-
quate consideration. 268 Since no such findings were made, however,
the case was remanded to the ASBCA for specific findings on the
issue of ACE's good faith in disputing the Government's
position. 2
69
G. Construction of Economic Price Adjustment Clause
The contract at issue in Brunswick Corp. v. United States270 was for
the delivery of a supply of camouflage systems to the Army over a
three-year period.27' It contained an economic price adjustment
(EPA) clause which assumed that offerors included in their bid
262. Id.
263. Id. (emphasis in original).
264. Id. at 1573.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1574 (quotingJOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH,JR., FORMATION OF GOVERN-




270. 951 F.2d 334 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
271. Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 951 F.2d 334, 335 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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prices for each of the contract years an amount for anticipated eco-
nomic fluctuations. The clause provided that contract price would
be adjusted only for unanticipated economic fluctuations that ex-
ceeded anticipated fluctuations by more than two percent. Antici-
pated fluctuations were established by escalation factors included in
Table I of the EPA clause. 272
The Army delayed awarding the contract until five months after
the specified date of commencement in the EPA clause, and the
award was made without any change in the Table I factors. 273 When
Brunswick submitted its request for equitable adjustment at the end
of each contract year, it recalculated the Table I factors to reflect the
award delay. The total contract price adjustment requested was
$952,090.274 The Government took the position that Brunswick was
bound by the unchanged Table I factors and was only entitled to
$338,279.275 The ASBCA agreed with the Government, and the
Federal Circuit affirmed.2 76 Vital to the court's holding was its con-
struction of the contract provisions which, although far from being a
model of clarity, provided for calculation of actual, unanticipated
fluctuations, but not for recalculation of anticipated fluctuations. 277
VI. ASBESTOS INDEMNIFICATION
In GAF Corp. v. United States,278 GAF sought indemnification from
the Government for liability resulting from its predecessor's insula-
tion of Navy ships. 279 Shipyard workers employed by Ruberoid,
GAF's predecessor, contracted asbestosis because of their exposure
to asbestos products during the performance of Navy contracts to
insulate ships. 2s 0 In the Claims Court, GAF contended that the
Navy knew of the potential health risks in the 1940s but deliberately
withheld information from Ruberoid. 28' The Claims Court dis-
missed GAF's claim on summary judgment, ruling that the Navy had
no contractual duty to warn an asbestos producer of the hazards in
its product.282 The Federal Circuit affirmed.28 3
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 336.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 337.
277. Id.
278. 932 F.2d 947 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 965 (1992).
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GAF first contended that the Claims Court improperly denied a
trial on the issue of whether the Government had a duty to disclose
its "superior knowledge" of asbestos hazards. 28 4 Following Lopez v.
A. C. & S. Inc. ,285 the court held that GAF could not show that the
Government was aware that Ruberoid lacked knowledge of asbestos
hazards and had no reason to obtain such information.28 6 There-
fore, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Claims Court that GAF
presented no triable issue.
287
Second, GAF contended it was entitled to a trial on whether the
Government breached an implied warranty of specifications for the
insulation. 28 8 The Government provisionally conceded that the
contracts contained design specifications. 289 The specifications did
not cause GAF's losses, however. GAF incurred losses because of
its predecessor Ruberoid's failure to place warnings on its products.
For this reason no triable issue was presented. 290
Finally, the court agreed with the Claims Court that the fact that
the Government originally sold the asbestos fiber to Ruberoid fails
to alter the result because UCC implied warranties do not apply to
government contracts. 2
9 1
Judge Newman dissented, principally on the ground that Lopez is
distinguishable because GAF presented evidence, absent in Lopez,
that the Government actively suppressed knowledge superior to
Ruberoid's. 292 According to Judge Newman, GAF presented suffi-
cient evidence of a discrepancy in knowledge significantly different
from that before the court in Lopez, and for that reason, the case
should not be dismissed. 293 Judge Newman objected to the court's
284. Id. at 949.
285. 858 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989). In Lopez, the court
held that although the Government was aware of asbestos hazards, it did not have the duty to
inform an experienced producer of asbestos that its products were hazardous. Lopez v. A.C.
& S. Inc., 858 F.2d 712, 717-18 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989).
To show a breach under the "superior knowledge" doctrine, a contractor must produce
evidence that it
(1) under[took] to perform without vital knowledge of a fact that affects perform-
ance costs or direction, (2) the government was aware the contractor had no knowl-
edge of and had no reason to obtain such information, (3) any contract specification
supplied misled the contractor, or did not put it on notice to inquire, and (4) the
government failed to provide the relevant information.
Id. at 717 (quoting American Ship Bldg. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 75, 79 (Ct. Cl. 1981)).
286. GAF, 932 F.2d at 949.
287. See id. (finding that GAF could not satisfy second prong of Lopez analysis).
288. Id. at 950.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 951.
292. Id. at 951-52 (Newman, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 953 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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apparent treatment of Lopez as a rule of law for all asbestos cases.291
VII. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A. Recovery of Costs Under the Brooks Act
In United States v. Compusearch Software Systems, 295 the issue was
whether section 759(f)(5)(C) of the Brooks Act entitles a prevailing
"interested party" to recover costs from the Government, including
attorney's fees attributable to discovery against an opposing inter-
venor.296 The GSBCA held that such costs were recoverable, 297 and
the Federal Circuit affirmed. 298
Compusearch filed a protest against the United States Corps of
Engineers alleging that a modification of a software contract unlaw-
fully restricted competition. 299 The awardee, CACI, Inc., inter-
vened, and both parties engaged in extensive discovery.30 0 In the
settlement of the case, Compusearch was deemed to be the prevail-
ing party entitled to the costs of pursuing the protest.30 The Corps
agreed to challenge only the reasonableness of Compusearch's fees,
not its entitlement to those fees.3 02 When Compusearch filed a mo-
tion for protest costs, the Corps responded by objecting to paying
for Compusearch's litigation against CACI.30 3 The Board found
that because the intervenor was squarely on the side of the Govern-
ment and because Compusearch had no choice but to litigate
against both the Government and the intervenor, Compusearch was
entitled to all costs, even those caused by litigation with another pri-
vate party.30 4
The Federal Circuit agreed. 30 5 According to the court, the statute
unambiguously states that an interested party may be awarded the
costs of pursuing a protest.30 6 Moreover, the statute clearly con-
294. See id. (stating that Lopez did not purport to decide universal principle of law and that
Lopez holding should not be read to require summary disposition of this case).
295. 936 F.2d 564 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
296. United States v. Compusearch Software Sys., 936 F.2d 564, 564 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
297. Compusearch Software Sys., 90-2 B.C.A. (CCH), 22,912, at 115,031 (Apr. 23,
1990).
298. Compusearch, 936 F.2d at 564.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 565.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Compusearch Software Sys., 90-2 B.C.A (CCH), 22,912, at 115,031 (Apr. 23,
1990).
305. Compusearch, 936 F.2d at 566.
306. Id.; see 40 U.S.C. § 759(O(5)(C) (1988) (stating that interested party is entitled to
costs of "(i) filing and pursuing the protest, including reasonable attorney's fees, and (ii) bid
and proposal preparation").
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templates that intervenors will participate in bid protests filed under
the Brooks Act. 0 7 Therefore, the court reasoned, Congress "in-
tended that costs of pursuing a protest included costs incurred as a
result of the actions of an intervenor. '8 0 8 The court rejected the
Government's suggestion that the principle of strict construction of
waivers of sovereign immunity dictates a contrary result.a09
B. Recoverability Under EAJA of Consultants' Fees Incurred Prior to
Appeal of Contracting Officer's Final Decision
In Levernier Construction, Inc. v. United States, °10 the Federal Circuit
reversed a Claims Court award of contract claim consultant fees in-
curred by the contractor in presenting its claim for equitable adjust-
ment to the contracting officer.31 The Claims Court awarded the
consultant fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA),3 12 finding that they were necessary for the preparation of
the contractor's case. 18 The Federal Circuit held it was error for
the Claims Court to fail to inquire first whether the contractor in-
curred the consultant's fees in a "civil action" as that term is used in
the EAJA.314 As a waiver of sovereign immunity, the court found
that the EAJA must be strictly construed and the term "civil action"
must be given its ordinary, and most restrictive, meaning to include
only judicial proceedings. 315 Since the consultant's fees were in-
curred prior to the contracting officer's decision, the contractor did
not incur them in a "civil action" under the EAJA. 3 16 The court in
Levernier further held that EAJA cost-of-living adjustments may not
be applied to paralegal fees, nor to enhance attorney fees not nor-
mally billed in excess of $75 per hour.
317
C. Applicability of the Debt Collection Act to Withheld Progress Payments
In Allied Signal, Inc. v. United States,318 the court considered a con-
307. Compusearch, 936 F.2d at 566; see 40 U.S.C. § 759(f)(6)(A) (1988) ("The final decision
of the board may be appealed... by any interested party, including interested parties who
intervene in any protest filed under this subsection ... .
308. Compusearch, 936 F.2d at 566.
309. Id.
310. 947 F.2d 497 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
311. Levernier Constr., Inc. v. United States, 947 F.2d 497, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
312. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
313. Levernier, 947 F.2d at 498.
314. Id. at 502.
315. Id. at 503. The court had earlier observed that the EAJA specifically defines "civil
action" to include an appeal from a contracting officer's final decision pursuant to the Con-
tract Disputes Act of 1978. Id- at 502.
316. Id. at 503.
317. Id. at 503-04.
318. 941 F.2d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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tractor's attempt to apply the Debt Collection Act of 1982319 to the
Government's withholding of progress payments. 3 20 Pursuant to an
economic price adjustment clause, the contracting officer reduced
the price of a multi-year contract for the development and produc-
tion of airplane engines.3 21 Because the contractor had already re-
ceived payment in excess of the new, reduced price, the contracting
officer refused to pay two of the contractor's requests for progress
payments.3 22 The contractor filed certified claims regarding both
the withheld payments and the price adjustment and, upon denial of
the claims by the contracting officer, appealed to the ASBCA.
323
The contractor argued that the procedural safeguards of the Debt
Collection Act had not been followed, but the Board held that with-
holding of contract payments is contract administration, not debt
collection.3 24 The contractor appealed and the Federal Circuit
affirmed.3
25
The court held that "debt," as used in the Debt Collection Act,
contemplates an existing liability running from the contractor to the
Government, not the denial of further liability by the Government
within an ongoing contract.3 26 Thus, in the present case, there was
no "debt" to trigger the Act's application.3 27
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
A. SDB Preference Requirement
In Commercial Energies, Inc. v. United States,3 28 the issue was whether
a solicitation complied with the small disadvantaged business (SDB)
preference contained in 10 U.S.C. § 2301 and 48 C.F.R.
§ 219.7001.329 The regulation states that 10% will be added to of-
fers from non-SDB firms prior to evaluation of price.35 0 The solici-
tation at issue involved the supply of natural gas to the Air Force."'1
The Air Force attempted to comply with the SDB requirements by
instructing offerors that award would be based on the sum of two
line items only, with ten percent added to the non-SDB offers with
319. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3711, 3716 (1988).
320. Allied Signal, Inc. v. United States, 941 F.2d 1194, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
321. Id. at 1194-95.
322. Id. at 1195.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1198-99.
326. Id. at 1198.
327. Id.
328. 929 F.2d 682 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
329. Commercial Energies, Inc. v. United States, 929 F.2d 682, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
330. 48 C.F.R. § 219.7001 (1990).
331. Commercial, 929 F.2d at 683.
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respect to those two items.33 2
The Claims Court held that basing award on two line items, and
applying the 10% differential only to those items, complied with the
SDB requirement.333 The Federal Circuit affirmed, concluding that
the Air Force's approach provided a rational procedure for meeting
the statutory goal.3 3 4
B. Record Retention Requirements-Fofeiture of Payments
In JANA, Inc. v. United States,33 5 the Government alleged that the
contractor overcharged it on a time and materials contract and de-
manded substantiation of the time charges.33 6 The Claims Court
ruled against the Government based on its interpretation of the con-
tract's record retention requirements.33 7 The issue before the Fed-
eral Circuit was whether the contractor was required to maintain the
records that would have been necessary to support its charges for
two, three, or four years.338 After reviewing various regulatory re-
quirements to determine which one applied to the records at issue,
the court concluded that the requirement applicable in this case was
three years.33 9 Thus, the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court
and held that the contractor was required to produce the records or
concede the Government's claim.3 40 Furthermore, the court held
that the contractor had not met the necessary requirements to assert
laches or estoppel against the Government.3 41
Given the fact that the Claims Court agreed with JANA that the
records supporting its invoices need only have been retained for two
years, the Federal Circuit's imposition of a forfeiture of all pay-
ments, based on its interpretation of the clause as requiring reten-
tion for three years, seems somewhat draconian. Because the
absence of the records prevented conclusive proof of overpayment
and because in fact there may have been no overpayment, equity
would seem to require that the contractor be allowed to retain part,
332. Id. at 684.
333. Id
334. Id. at 685.
335. 936 F.2d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 869 (1992).
336. JANA, Inc. v. United States, 936 F.2d 1265, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 869 (1992).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1268.
339. Id. at 1269.
340. Id. at 1268 (reversing Claims Court ruling that retention period was only two years).
341. Id. at 1269-70 (finding that it is not clear whether defenses of laches and estoppel
may be asserted against Government and, even if defenses could be asserted, Government
delay was not unreasonable and inexcusable and JANA did not meet necessary elements for
estoppel).
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if not all, of the disputed payments. This result could be reached on
a theory of quantum meruit, among other possible approaches.
C. Causes of Action
In Gould, Inc. v. United States,342 the Federal Circuit vacated a
Claims Court decision dismissing Gould's complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.3 43 The Navy
awarded Gould a five-year contract to build tactical radios at a fixed
price. Gould submitted a number of claims for relief based on al-
leged violations of the contract by the Navy. Gould also submitted a
claim requesting equitable reformation and upward adjustment of
the contract price based on the Navy's failure to disclose relevant
information about the design of the radio being procured.3 44 After
Gould failed to meet delivery schedules, the parties terminated the
contract and settled all contract claims except for the claim for equi-
table reformation of the contract and upward adjustment of the
price.3 45
The Federal Circuit vacated the Claims Court decision on two
grounds. First, the Claims Court erred in assuming that the parties
had limited Gould's remedy to reformation of the contract.3 46 The
court found instead that the parties intended to permit Gould to
seek monetary damages.3 47 Second, the Claims Court erred in dis-
missing Gould's three counts: (1) that the contract was invalid be-
cause the Navy failed to provide a stable design for a multiyear
award, (2) that the Government withheld necessary information,
and (3) that the parties made a mutual mistake.3 48 The Claims
Court's dismissal of the first count was improper because it con-
strued the facts against Gould.3 49 Its dismissal of the second count
was improper because Gould satisfied the requirements of notice
pleading.350 Finally, the court concluded that mutual mistake was
properly pled.3 5 1
342. 935 F.2d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
343. Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
344. Id. at 1272.
345. Id. at 1272-73.
346. Id. at 1275.
347. Id at 1274-75.
348. Id. at 1275-76.
349. IL at 1275.
350. Id at 1275-76.
351. Id at 1276.
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D. Liability of Surety for Prejudgment Interest
In Insurance Co. of North America v. United States,352 the court re-
viewed a Claims Court holding that a surety was liable for payment
of prejudgment interest accruing after the Government demanded
payment on a performance bond.s53 The Insurance Company of
North America (INA) issued a bond in the amount of $129,000 to
guarantee the performance of a timber contractor.3 54 One year af-
ter the contractor's default, the Government demanded payment.
3 55
The timber contractor contested the default determination in the
Claims Court, which found for the Government and ordered INA to
pay prejudgment interest in addition to the full bond amount.3 56 In
affirming, the Federal Circuit held that the assessment of prejudg-
ment interest on a surety bond is not meant to penalize the surety
beyond the bond limit but does ensure that the creditor is fully com-
pensated for the use of the money beyond its due date.
3 5 7
E. Use and Possession Distinguished from Final Acceptance
In M.C. & D. Capital Corp. v. United States,358 the contractor con-
tested the propriety of its termination for default on a roofing con-
tract.35 9 The contractor first argued that because the Government
took possession of the work as substantially complete prior to the
termination, final acceptance had occurred.360 The court rejected
this argument, noting that the contract and the FAR explicitly pro-
vided that possession and use shall not be deemed to constitute final
acceptance. 36 1 M.C. & D.'s second argument was that termination
was improper because it had substantially performed the con-
tract.3 62 This argument was also rejected by the court, which held
that the numerous uncorrected deficiencies in the contractor's work
precluded a finding of substantial performance. 363
352. 951 F.2d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1991).




357. See id. at 1246 ("This interest returns the parties to the financial position they would
have occupied had the surety paid its obligation when due.").
358. 948 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
359. M.C. & D. Capital Corp. v. United States, 948 F.2d 1251, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
360. Id. at 1254-55.
361. Id. at 1255.
362. Id. at 1256.
363. Id.
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F. Sanctions
In Romala Corp. v. United States,364 the contractor argued that in
terminating for nonperformance, the Government breached the
contract.365 The Claims Court dismissed the action, finding that
Romala failed to submit design plans as required under the contract
and, consequently, the termination for default was not a breach.
3 66
The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the Claims Court's inter-
pretation of the contract and resulting outcome were correct.367
In addition, the Federal Circuit determined that Romala's appeal
was frivolous. 36 8 The court found that "Romala's post-filing con-
duct, consisting of irrelevant and illogical arguments based on fac-
tual misrepresentations and false premises, is the sort of appellate
litigation behavior that makes an appeal frivolous as argued, and thus
eligible for sanctions."'3 6
9
G. Captions
Boeing Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Watkins 370 concerned the proper
caption on appeal. Boeing argued that the GSBCA, not the United
States, should have been identified as the appellee pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(a).371 The Federal Circuit,
however, concluded that because both the CDA and the Brooks Act
designate the agency head, not the Board or the United States, as
the party entitled to appeal, the agency head is also the proper re-
spondent on appeal. 3
72
CONCLUSION
The 1991 government contract decisions of the Federal Circuit
illustrate the court's need for judges who have more background
and experience in this sometimes highly technical field. While the
court on the whole was able to dispose adequately and fairly of
those cases that presented more or less traditional and straightfor-
ward issues of contract interpretation and statutory construction, a
number of the court's decisions regarding more complex and spe-
364. 927 F.2d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
365. Romala Corp. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1219, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
366. Id. at 1221.
367. Id. at 1221-22.
368. Id. at 1222-24.
369. Id. at 1222.
370. 935 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
371. Boeing Petroleum Servs., Inc. v. Watkins, 935 F.2d 1260, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
372. Id. at 1261.
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cialized government contract issues have tended to confuse rather
than clarify the applicable law.

